Does legal epistemology rest on a mistake? On fetishism, two‐tier system design, and conscientious fact‐finding

Philosophical Issues 31 (1):85-103 (2021)
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Abstract

Philosophical Issues, Volume 31, Issue 1, Page 85-103, October 2021.

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Author Profiles

David Enoch
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Levi Spectre
Open University of Israel

Citations of this work

Knowledge, Individualised Evidence and Luck.Dario Mortini - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3791-3815.
Criminal Proof: Fixed or Flexible?Lewis Ross - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly (4):1-23.
The Foundations of Criminal Law Epistemology.Lewis Ross - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.
The sensitivity of legal proof.Guido Melchior - 2024 - Synthese 203 (5):1-23.

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