Jean-Paul Sartre, in Being and Nothingness, develops the concept of “bad faith” in order to account for the paradoxical fact that knowledge can be ignorant of itself, and thus that a self-conscious subject can deceive itself while being aware of its own deception. Sartre claims that Freudian psychoanalysis would account for self-deception by positing an unconsciousness that guides consciousness without consciousness being aware of it. Therefore, Freudian psychoanalysis is an insufficient model with which to address bad faith. I disagree. (...) There is a specific psychic mechanism in Freud that answers Sartre’s criteria for bad faith, and it is called “disavowal” . Disavowal is the mechanism responsible for fetishism. And thus, fetishism is the Freudian account of bad faith. (shrink)

Philosophical Issues, Volume 31, Issue 1, Page 85-103, October 2021.

Is it possible to remain a sports fan when prominent sports teams and events are utilized to “sportswash” human rights abuses and other controversies? Indeed, while there is an abundance of analyses critiquing different instances of sportswashing, the exploration of the role of sportswashing and its connection to the “sports fan” presents an essential and necessary area of investigation and theoretical inquiry. To unpick this dilemma, this article proposes the concept of “fetishistic disavowal” to help theorize the impact of sportswashing, (...) as well as its relation to the sports fan and critical sports academic. This argues that, as spectators and fans of sport—and, moreover, as critical academics—we often acknowledge and accept that sport is used to perpetuate and even maintain a variety of social, economic, and political inequalities. Yet, while we are aware of such knowledge, we nonetheless remain fully capable of disavowing this very knowledge as an accepted part of sport. Given this, it is argued that the fetishization of sport can provide a suitable conduit for the fetishistic disavowal that sportswashing requires, with the concept offering a unique way of approaching sport’s inherent contradictions, while also theorizing how subjects relate to these contradictions as part of their involvement in and with sport. Where sportswashing directly implicates the fan in its implementation—relying upon a level of fetishistic disavowal between the fan and their club and proffering a disavowed acknowledgement of the effects of sportswashing and its interpellation through sport—this article outlines how applications of fetishistic disavowal provide a unique theoretical lens through which analyses of sport, and its ethical significance, can be critiqued. (shrink)

This essay posits the existence of two forms of disavowal: cynical and fetishistic. It explores how cynical disavowal involves maintaining a manipulative distance by obscuring the gap between belief and action, allowing the cynic to disavow their investment in an unattainable object and their knowledge of the Other’s lack. In contrast, fetishistic disavowal acknowledges both the objective reality of things and their subjective appearance to the fetishist. Unlike cynicism, fetishism does not rely on obscuring the gap between belief (...) and action; instead, it recognizes and embraces both aspects. In doing so, the essay highlights significant differences between the manipulative distance of the cynic and the self-awareness of the fetishist. It acknowledges the role of cynicism in maintaining the limits and prohibitions within ideology and authority, through examples of banality, while also emphasizing the unique qualities of fetishistic disavowal. (shrink)

For non-analytic ethical naturalists, externalism about moral motivation is an attractive option: it allows naturalists to embrace a Humean theory of motivation while holding that moral properties are real, natural properties. However, Michael Smith has mounted an important objection to this view. Smith observes that virtuous agents must have non-derivative motivation to pursue specific ends that they believe to be morally right; he then argues that this externalist view ascribes to the virtuous agent only a direct de dicto desire to (...) do what is morally right, but not a direct motivation to be kind, help those in need, et. I first clarify this “fetishism objection”; I then show how the non-analytical naturalist can provide an understanding of virtuous motivation that is immune to this objection. (shrink)

In the dissertation I examine the split between cognition and eros in Kant's notion of objectivity, which has become paradigmatic for modern theories about knowledge. I argue that the split between cognition, on the one hand, and feelings and desires, on the other, does not capture the necessary conditions of knowledge, as Kant claims, but involves a suppression of erotic factors of existence. ;The split between pure knowledge and sensual existence in Kant's thought reflects an ascetic tradition (...) inherited from both Greek and Christian sources, which views the body, sexuality, and in particular women's sexuality as a source of pollution. According to this tradition, since thought must be divested of the pollution of sensuous existence, women's sexuality precludes them from rational activity. Consequently, the philosophical commitment to purity has justified the exclusion of women from the practice of knowledge. ;The particular form of asceticism which is evident in Kant's treatment of sensibility of objective knowledge, of morality, and of aesthetic judgement, reflects the reified nature of relations in an emerging capitalist economy. The suppression of the immediate, sensual qualities in both the subject and object of knowledge, in Kant's system, corresponds to the suppression of the immediate, qualitative features of the subject and object in the process of commodity production. Both persons and things become reduced to a formal abstract equivalence. Kant's notion of objectivity makes normative this objectification of relations between persons and things. ;Thus, the paradigm of objective knowledge is not only damaging to the thinker, who must detach himself from the emotional and sensual facets of existence. It serves as an ideology which has justified the exclusion of women from the pursuit of knowledge, and which more generally legitimates the distorted human relations generated by the world of commodity production. ;By considering Kant's commitment to pure knowledge in the context of the genealogy of the concept of purity, the themes of asceticism and fetishism emerged as mutually illuminating. Implicit in the ascetic denial of sensuality is a dialectic which leads to an objectification of persons and things. Moreover, the fetishism of commodities involves a detachment of erotic interests from persons which results in an obsessive interest in objects. (shrink)

I offer an ethnographic analysis of two “theory” classes in an elite American literary studies program. First, I examine the classroom's bureaucratic form, as it is structured by power, time and space, and made visible in syllabi and attempted pedagogical reforms. I then turn to pedagogical practice, examining the forms of knowledge and power implicit in classroom discourse. I show that ideological stances toward theory vary according to individual status in the theoretical field. I consider the epistemic fetishism (...) of the “text” within classroom knowledge-making practices. Finally, I draw out some implications of my analysis for reflexive academic research, with particular attention to Bourdieu's reflexive social science. (shrink)

We argue that the gap between an authentically ethical conviction of sustainability and a behaviour that avoids confronting the terrifying reality of its ethical point of reference is characteristic of the field of business sustainability. We do not accuse the field of business sustainability of ethical shortcomings on the account of this attitude–behaviour gap. If anything, we claim the opposite, namely that there resides an ethical sincerity in the convictions of business scholars to entrust capitalism and capitalists with the mammoth (...) task of reversing, the terrifying reality of ecological devastation. Yet, the very illusory nature of this belief in capitalism’s captains to save us from the environmentally devastating effects of capitalism gives this ethical stance a tragic beauty. While sincere and authentic, it nevertheless is an ethical stance that relies on an “exclusionary gesture of refusing to see”, what in psychoanalysis is referred to as a fetishist disavowal of reality. We submit that this disavowal is fetishistic because the act is not simply one of repressing the real. If it was, we would rightly expect that we could all see the truth if we only provide more or better information to fill the subject’s lack of knowledge. The problem is that the fetishist transfers a fantasy of the real as the real. In the case of destructive capitalism, the fetishist disavows that particular reality by believing in another, thus subjectively negating the lack. Therefore, from the perspective of psychoanalytic theory, we submit that the gap between attitude and behaviour is best understood not only as an ethical flaw, but also as an essential component of an ethics that makes possible the field of business sustainability. (shrink)

1. The most important aspect of touch is its relation to time and space, a relation which is established by the movement of touching itself. Referring to the ideas of E. Straus, the distinction between touching and being touched is elaborated in light of experiments done by us with animals. 2. Touching is: being in one's own limits and at the same time going beyond these limits, a situation in which the touched object is felt at the same time as (...) a "Gegenstand" and as "Mit-seiend." "Pour le tactile, c'est l'être à deux qui se place au premier rang" . The awareness of being by the sense of touch is particularly poignant in the case of touching oneself, which is an exceptional unity of the active and the passive state of mind. 3. The tactile recognition of form also presents a dialectic of activity and passivity, a dialectic which takes place in the form of a development which conquers time, and this after a scheme produced during the act of grasping itself. We refer to the studies of V. von Weizsäcker on the "Gestaltkreis." We must also remember the basic restlessness of the hand, which becomes lasting in the play of the hand with an object. 4. The hand can hold an object. In doing so a schematic tactile image is given, an image which functions as a hypothesis or as an organizing principle of the proleptic development of further tactile exploration. The phenomenological analysis of touch with the hand appears as a prefiguration of thought by synthetic judgments. Thus, it is true, as Herder remarked, and as Gold-stein and Merleau-Ponty confirmed, that perception by man and spiritual existence are identical. 5. Referring to the research of Révèsz and Palagyi, the real nature of the tactile world is anlyzed. Tactile exploration is done according to a real development, during which take place anticipatory and retrospective determinations which assure the continuity of the event and its meaning. Tactile perception permits description of the continuous unity of the discontinuous phases which we can state objectively "as if" expectation and memory, preliminary judgments and their checking, conceptual fixations and corrections had been put to work. 6. Important is the affective and emotional aspect of tactile impressions and their connection with inter-human relationships. 7. By touch, man establishes in a "feeling" way a personal relationship with the matter of things, which is hidden to the distance senses. This participation has a double aspect. It is like the birth of a "mood," of a "Befindlichkeit," but at the same time it is the active point of departure of a "feeling," of an "understanding," of an "inner grasp," of a being moved, of a being struck by the touched object which is then in our presence as a real "quale," as a material object, as a being in itself. We remember the proper nature of the caress, by which the "being together" of the caressed object complements that of the active caresser. The usual concepts by means of which, in practical and gnostic life, the most important tactile qualities are indicated intend to refer us to the characteristics of the things which take up space in the geometric world and in objectively measurable space, and on which is founded our natural orientation. We remember von Hornborstel's research on the intermodal characteristics of tactile impressions. These show us how a "knowledge" which accompanies perception can change an impression of feeling. The affective relationship, determined by a shaded "knowledge" and by a system of values, changes tangible reality, the substantiality of the body, of the "flesh." This affective change of matter, this "phenomenal transsubstantiation," easily becomes a reality in connection with objects of which we know that they belong or did belong to someone. The meaning which a thing has changes the matter of the object, an object which precisely by the touch is present "in the flesh." This is illustrated more precisely by the phenomena of fetishism, and by simple experiences of daily life. If we look for an anthropological point of view from which touch, of which the hand realizes the point of view will have to be attempted starting from the unimaginable certitude that the ontological unity of nature and spirit is in man the reality of a possible participation, a participation which, in our existence, is only indicated. The "restlessness" of the hand, never fulfilled and always searching, which we noted, is the human token of our concrete existence. Thus touch shows us what Valery remarked about the mind: "The mind is at the mercy of the body, as the blind are at the mercy of the seeing.". (shrink)

Este texto analizará críticamente la actual fase económica para mostrar la importancia de los bienes comunes intangibles. Sondea la tesis de un nuevo modo de producción «en ciernes», basado en la gestión colaborativa. Analiza los intangibles de acuerdo a su calidad y carácter. Compara los sistemas de patentes y derechos de propiedad intelectual que permiten su apropiación y las resistencias a su «comoditización» desde el software libre y las propuestas de flexibilización de derechos de autor. Advierte sobre el «fetichismo tecnológico» (...) y propone un marco mínimo de discernimiento en dilemas vinculados a estas materias.It will scan critically the current economic phase to show the importance of the intangible commons. Investigate the thesis of a new mode of production based on collaborative knowledge management. Analyze the specificities of the intangible commons according to their quality and character. We will compare the patent and intellectual property rights that allow its appropriation. Study the resistance to its «commoditization» from the free software paradigm and the proposed relaxation of copyright. Warn of the risks of new forms of «technological fetishism» and conclude by proposing a minimum framework of discernment dilemmas in these matters. (shrink)

Michel Foucault's The History of Sexuality-the first volume of which was published in 1976-exerts a vast influence across the humanities and social sciences. However, Foucault's interest in the history of sexuality began as early as the 1960s, when he taught two courses on the subject. These lectures offer crucial insight into the development of Foucault's thought yet have remained unpublished until recently. This book presents Foucault's lectures on sexuality for the first time in English. In the first series, held at (...) the University of Clermont-Ferrand in 1964, Foucault asks how sexuality comes to be constituted as a scientific body of knowledge within Western culture and why it derived from the analysis of "perversions"-morbidity, homosexuality, fetishism. The subsequent course, held at the experimental university at Vincennes in 1969, shows how Foucault's theories were reoriented by the events of May 1968; he refocuses on the regulatory nature of the discourse of sexuality and how it serves economic, social, and political ends. Examining creators of political and literary utopias in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, from Sade to Fourier to Marcuse, who attempted to integrate "natural" sexualities, including transgressive forms, into social and economic life, Foucault elaborates a double critique of the naturalization and the liberation of sexuality. Together, the lectures span a range of interests, from abnormality to heterotopias to ideology, and they offer an unprecedented glimpse into the evolution of Foucault's transformative thinking on sexuality. (shrink)

The article analyzes the problem of education development in the context of the formation of a society in which modern technologies, and in particular, artificial intelligence (AI) developments, play a key role. Since fast learning machines are being introduced into all spheres of life (production, services, entertainment) of society, and its development depends on the intensity of the introduction of AI technologies, virtual spaces are increasingly influencing the human life, everyday life and the labour market, the problem of the development (...) of education, including university education, its purpose, tasks, content and nature is relevant. The point is that AI is actively involved in the learning process, and it is here that its use threatens to displace humans and interpersonal communication. Automation of assessment, generation of AI answers create a situation of a kind of iconic fetishism, and the educational process turns into a simulacrum. This prompts the search for new forms of human activity, which should be developed by the educational process aimed at stimulating thinking. Therefore, it is necessary to abandon the model of objective factual knowledge that can be automated and executed by machines. The development of AI will lead to the disappearance of linear thinking practices shaped by the culture of writing, cognitive functions will also be transformed, and humans will rapidly move beyond subject-centred vision. In the posthuman mindset, interaction with any non-human beings/entities creates prospects for new forms of human activity. In a world where there are more and more available resources, when each autonomous subject determines the trajectory of learning, the university as a centre of social development must be rethought. University education should be aimed at interpersonal communication, focusing on project-based activities, interpretive practices, problematisation, and creativity. The educational process should be shaped by a balance between AI technologies and the development of human intelligence, which increases the importance of interpersonal communication in the educational process. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Against Method in Science and Religion: Recent Debates on Rationality and Theology by Josh ReevesWhitney A. BaumanAgainst Method in Science and Religion: Recent Debates on Rationality and Theology. Josh Reeves. London, UK: Routledge, 2019. 154 pp. $170.00 hard-cover; $54.95 paperback; $39.71 eBook.Josh Reeves has written a very accessible and well-argued book for those interested in the field known as “science and religion.” It is a timely book that (...) I would use in conversation with other works that are questioning the continued validity and usefulness of modern Western university disciplines. In a world that is marked by globalization and climate change, and one in which many histories, religions, cultures, and possible futures come into contact with and change one another, perhaps we need to rethink what we mean by both “science” and “religion.”The general argument of the book is that Western scholars of science and religion have, until very recently paid more attention to the philosophy of science rather than the history of science. As such, these scholars have participated in a form of “methodological fetishism” (9) and have leaned too heavily on the idea that the sciences participate in some sort of unified program. In particular, Reeves deals with three figures within theology and science (I think it is important to distinguish theology from religion more clearly than the author does), whose research programs seek to place the claims of theology on some type of equal footing with the claims of science.Nancey Murphy, for instance, applies Imre Lakatos’s idea of core and auxiliary hypotheses to theology (40). Murphy’s project is trying to show how theology can be scientific by using this methodology (49). Though recognizing that knowledge in both theology and science change over time, it is most often auxiliary hypotheses rather than the core hypotheses that need to be altered. In this way, scientific and theological programs can remain in continuity over time, rather than experiencing disjointed paradigm shifts.Alister McGrath opts, instead, for a type of “critical realism” (56). There is a real world pushing back against human ideas and concepts and science can give us valid information about that world, but we must critically analyze the data since no data is raw (59). Against some post-modern claims, McGrath still argues that ontology determines epistemology (61). Reeves argues that McGrath fails to analyze older, discarded theories in his reading of the development of various scientific discoveries, thereby paving over the historical knowledge from the sciences that we would now see as outdated. This serves [End Page 96] to support an illusion that there is some sort of “global realism” that connects all sciences in a common ground and narrative (68).Finally, J. Wentzel van Huyssteen starts from the idea that there is no global common ground and sets out to offer a post-foundational theology based upon post-foundational philosophies of science and epistemology (78). For van Huyssteen, rationality is intersubjective, embodied and emerges from eco-social contexts, and thus, he highlights the serious problem of projecting a unified, global rationality as a unified basis for the sciences (82). Instead, he constructs a trans-local rationality that takes into account the multiple perspectives making up what we think of as a unified understanding of reason (84). Reeves argues that while this may be a step along the way to a method for “theology and science,” it does not offer us a way to navigate differences between conflicting knowledge claims (93). I would suggest that this is precisely the point of a post-foundational project: there is no overarching value but rather common grounds must be gained through dialogues, conversations, and translations.After engaging with these three philosophical theologians, Reeves proceeds to the second part of the book, in which he more directly criticizes distinct concepts of “religion” and “science” historically. For instance, he describes the tendency of early historians of science and those in the field of “science and religion” to erase the religiosity of early figures such as Isaac Newton and Francis Bacon (107). These figures mixed theological ideas with what we might call magical ideas in order to further develop natural... (shrink)

The formation of the concepts and categories that human thinking and culture use is a process that is complex and long-lasting. This specificity of the logical framework of knowledge is due to its historical character, which focuses primarily on the development of consciousness in the stage of development. It is known that the original representations of man about the world had a mythological color. They noted direct intertwining in the practice of everyday relations, and therefore they did not raise (...) the question of their own essence. The same could not have happened, because the individual has not yet realized himself as a unique person. His personal "I" was inseparable from nature or was seen as a part of the generic team. The original man has not yet reached the understanding of self-determination and did not possess the ability to structure the consciousness in its relation to the world. Therefore, in terms of mythological worldview, the term "protocotographic forms of thinking", which represented the empirical integrity of man and the environment, was correctly used. Their specificity was to focus on the concrete. Animistic, fetishistic, and totemic beliefs set themselves the goal of discovering in the environment and distinguishing objects of magic or non-magic in the present concreteness. "Of course, as Ukrainian scholars point out," the protocategorial forms of the primitive and mythological consciousness did not have yet such a certainty that would represent an integral part consisting not of parts but of a dynamic organic ". (shrink)

This chapter offers an account of the aspect of nineteenth‐century naturalism, by focusing on the work of J. S. Mill and Auguste Comte. Both philosophers have high ambitions for naturalism, aiming to offer a sweeping account of all of human knowledge in naturalistic terms. Mill argued that the metaphysical thinking must already have started to exert an influence in order for monotheistic approaches to take hold, and that Comte's account of the theological stage overstated the extent to which fetishistic (...) or polytheistic understanding of phenomena could exist independently of one another. But these are minor disagreements, framed in terms of a narrative that Mill basically accepts. Mill thought Comte's three stage theory important for understanding the rise our way of conceptualizing the world, and consistent with his own account of the rise of scientific induction. (shrink)

Recent scholarship on the idea of communism leads to questions of organization and what Michael Hardt refers to as “the problem of leadership.” Beyond the critical assessment of the crises of contemporary capitalism, and beyond the existing social democratic solutions, a psychoanalytically-informed Žižekian notion of the party offers solutions to ultra-left theories of networked horizontalism as well as versions of the party that repeat the problems of communist modernism. If the context of climate change, economic inequality and political authoritarianism require (...) that we reconsider “what is to be done” about global neoliberal capitalism, then the idea of the political party, understood in terms of Jacques Lacan’s Discourse of the Analyst, can provisionally occupy the place of a neutral knowledge of the objective demands of history that is premised on the experiences of the emancipatory left. Like the Analyst, the party does not stand in for or represent the people. However, through the fetishistic aspect of representation, as opposed to materially or ontologically-grounded guarantees for political power, the party registers a minimal difference from a technocratic University Discourse and an ultra-left Discourse of the Hysteric. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article outlines the concept of the early modern idea of religion through the notion of sacrifice, from Socinus on through Grotius and Spinoza to Diderot’s Encyclopedia. It is generally held that the philosophical representation of religion of the seventeenth century ‘set the stage’ for later Enlightenment philosophers. My argument runs in a different direction. I intend to show that the Enlightenment philosophers’ concept of religious history stemmed not only from the philosophical tradition, but also from their knowledge (...) of antiquarianism. In order to understand the genealogy of the Enlightenment idea of religion it is essential to acknowledge its roots in the antiquarian history of religions of the seventeenth century when a new idea of religious belief emerged with practice of sacrifice at its core. Grotius and the antiquarians inquired into whether religion was a universal phenomenon, what were its categories – such as belief and sacrifice – and the truth and falsehood of these. Diderot considered this history of sacrifice and ceremonies as the fundamental ‘deed’ of the religious experience, which he analysed employing both the philosophical and the historical perspectives through the category of fetishism. (shrink)

Karl Marx u Njemačkoj ideologiji i Kapitalu uvodi optičku metaforu ljudskog oka kroz koju tumači problematiku ideologije i robnog fetišizma. U radu se razmatraju mogućnosti interpretacija ovih Marxovih metafora. U svjetlu se tih interpretacija razmatra jedna od središnjih postavki vizualnih studija da se vizualna kultura moderniteta gradi na potkopavanju epistemološke prevlasti viđenja. Rad problematizira koncepciju modernističkog utjelovljenog promatrača koju uvodi američki povjesničar umjetnosti Jonathan Crary. Prema Craryju, ova drugačija ideja promatračkog subjekta potkopava klasičnu filozofijsku ideju o rastjelovljenosti spoznajnog subjekta. Prema (...) Craryjevoj argumentaciji takva se klasična ideja subjektivnosti s modernitetom ne zamišlja više kao temelj spoznaje, nego kao figura ideologije. Međutim, preokretanje Marxova odnosa između optičkih metafora i pojmova ideologije te fetišističkog karaktera robe baca potpuno drugačije svjetlo na pitanje promatračke subjektivnosti. Završna je postavka rada da se camera obscura i ljudsko oko ne trebaju isključivo shvaćati kao puke metafore koje je Marx u Njemačkoj ideologiji i Kapitalu upotrebljavao kao analogije preko kojih je tumačio pojmove kao što su ideologija ili fetišizam robe. Postupak čitanja može isto tako ići i u obrnutom smjeru: camera obscura i ljudsko oko su pojmovi koji su objašnjeni posredstvom već definiranih pojmova ideologije i fetišizma robe. Ako se perspektiva čitanja zamijeni na taj način postaje jasno da iz postavke o utjelovljenom promatraču ne proizlazi nužno i postavka o utjelovljenom karakteru doživljajā viđenja.Camera obscura and human eye were key metaphors engaged in the interpretation of the concepts of ideology and commodity fetishism in Karl Marx’s fundamental texts German ideology and Capital . The aim of this paper is to reconsider interpretative strategies that Marx used while he was proposing his main thesis on ideology and commodity fetishism. In the light of these considerations the paper addresses one of the central propositions of the contemporary visual studies that modern visual culture undermines epistemological privileging of the vision. The paper critically discusses the concept of the embodied observer that American art historian Jonathan Crary introduced in the philosophy, art history, cultural history and visual studies. According to Crary the idea of vision as primarily rooted in the corporeality of the observer undercuts Cartesian idea about vision as primarily disembodied event. Crary claims that with the rise of the modernity disembodied subjectivity turns from the site of the knowledge into the figure of ideology. However, reversing the Marx’s relation between optical metaphors and concepts of the ideology and commodity fetishism poses the problem of the observing subjectivity in the quite different terms. Final proposal of this paper is that camera obscura and human eye should not only be considered as optical metaphors that Marx used in German ideology and Capital as mere analogies for explaining concepts such as ideology or commodity fetishism. Reading procedure could well go into the opposite direction: the camera obscura and the human eye are the concepts explained via the already defined concepts of the ideology and commodity fetishism. If the reading perspective is switched in that way it is clear that the thesis of the embodied observer does not necessarily entail the embodied character of the visual sensations. (shrink)

In the summer of 1985 my children, Laura and Aurélien, then seven and five, knelt before a Barbie doll standing at the foot of a Ken doll on an imaginary cross. I remember vividly the scene because I took a picture of it. We were vacationing in Ticino and visiting the local churches, so I assumed that this play imitated the iconography to which they were being exposed. After reading Moshenska's Iconoclasm as Child's Play, however—whose cover shows “Josh McBig,” a (...) bearded version of Ken with outstretched arms and severed legs, photographed by the Jackson sisters as part of their “Doll Games” project—I have to wonder: was there not in this play an element of parody or blasphemy, of iconoclasm even, prompted perhaps by my working at the time on contemporary “vandalism”? Or, on the contrary, was there an element of devotion, of faith produced by mimicking the ritual? I am now faced with the conundrum of “the adult's imagination of the child's imagination,” to borrow a phrase (from Michael Taussig) that resonates through Moshenska's strange and fascinating book.Sometime in the 1530s, in Redcliffe Cross in Bristol, in the west of England, a preacher named Roger Edgeworth denounced what he regarded as a current upsurge of impiety and singled out as evidence that “many Images” taken from the dissolved monasteries “haue bene caryed abrod, and gyuen to children to playe wyth all,” so that when their parents ask them what it is that they are playing with, they make them laugh by answering: “I haue here myne ydoll.” “Ydoll” is a portmanteau word—as Lewis Carroll would have said—combining “doll” and “idol,” and Moshenska finds “scattered but definite evidence... that holy things were made into playthings with sufficient frequency for it to be considered an established and recognized part of iconoclastic practice in the early modern period.” He analyzes a few other examples, but Edgeworth's sermon supplies him with the primal scene of his book: he admits to “having been seduced by this passage..., caught up in its folds, brought back to it time and again,” so that Iconoclasm as Child's Play bears some structural resemblance to Henry James's novella The Turn of the Screw. Consistently—and at times obtrusively—self-reflective, it also wonders whether its approach can be regarded as “a kind of iconoclasm” or is intended “as a form of play”—lusus serius, naturally.Iconoclasm as Child's Play explores with great ingenuity the complex relationships between the Christian rite, iconoclasm, and child's play: a Byzantine empress enables her icons to survive the Quarrel of Images by calling them her “dolls”; Protestants trivialize the Roman Catholic ritual by comparing it to “trifles” and the “mere playing of children”; in The Praise of Folly, Erasmus embraces the “foolishness” of Christianity, centered on the figure of a broken body that renders attacks against its images and iconoclastic theory itself—as Bruno Latour has shown—deeply equivocal. A further turn of the screw takes place in the missionary and mercantile context of Malacca, where the Dutch settlers impute childishness both to the Portuguese Jesuits who preceded them and to the local religions. The notions of “fetish” and “fetishism,” as Moshenska shows, charge their targets with a misattribution to objects of agency, responsibility, and desires.The object of Moshenska's inquiry, which he claims less convincingly to include “art-things,” is “polysemic and polychronic,” and a leitmotif of the interpretations he proposes is the instability of the status and meaning of what is interpreted, be it a thing, an action, or a word. Among the many epistemic virtues he attributes to iconoclasm as child's play is the questioning of “the sharp... divisions between modern and premodern” implied by historical narratives such as Max Weber's account of the Reformation as the “expulsion of play” and “disenchantment” of the world. A long meditation on the temporality of play concludes by pointing out the “toy potential of all things” and referring to James Gibson's notion of “affordance.” Indeed, child's play, whatever adults want to do with it, often consists in multiplying and inventing affordances, and it is capable of turning not only “idols” into “dolls,” but also “dolls” into “idols.”. (shrink)

We challenge the prevalent opinion that consumption does not seem to matter as much as production and defy the fetishism of industrial work. We explore the implications of the premise that under conditions of cognitive capitalism consumption dictates what production does, when and how. We explain that in a post-industrial global society and economy fashion, branding, instant gratification of desires, and ephemeral consumer tastes govern production and consumption. The London riots of August 2011 send us a warning that consumption (...) and cognitive capitalism are asphyxiating in the structures and norms of industrial capitalism that are still in place. (shrink)

Multisensory Environment and Sensory Deprivation in the Treatment of Reception Defects This article deals with two types of alternative therapy and treatment methods. They are considered to be used in media education, in the treatment of reception defects, such as abuse, narcosis, neurosis, frustration, fetishism and superimposition. Purpose of this article is to summarize and discuss not only these media reality reception defects, but also to object them in two ways - multisensory environment within special pedagogic treatment, sensory deprivation (...) within alternative psychiatric therapy. Methodology in this study is to consider them as using media in the way of organic reception and therefore included in media anthropology, education and ethics. Within media reality a system reception feedback is needed, therefore the method "anything goes" for this use is explained. The aim of this article is to bind alternative media based methods with the research of reception of the media reality and the outstanding media anthropological issues: therapy, education, ethics, philosophy, etc. The scientific aim not only of this study, but also of author's whole work is to sustain the whole - media anthropological view - by using partial methods for media reality analysis and proving its relevance in disputing other theories being enclosed within media discourse. Also the ethics - code of dealing with technological extensions of human competence - the media - is a part of the organic reception. As the conclusion a need of such kind of research, education and treatment is objected and the examples of author's effort are explained. There is strongly recommended to create and use other media anthropology based equipment: Hitchhiker's Guide to Media Reality, A Chronicle of Abused media, blogs, a textbook, etc. (shrink)