Hypothetical Consent and the Value (s) of Autonomy

Ethics 128 (1):6-36 (2017)
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Abstract

Hypothetical consent is puzzling. On the one hand, it seems to make a moral difference across a wide range of cases. On the other hand, there seem to be principled reasons to think that it cannot. In this article I put forward reasonably precise formulations of these general suspicions regarding hypothetical consent; I draw several distinctions regarding the ways in which hypothetical consent may make a moral difference; I distinguish between two autonomy-related concerns, nonalienation and sovereignty; and, utilizing these distinctions, I show that—and in a preliminary way, when—the objections to the moral significance of hypothetical consent fail.

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David Enoch
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Citations of this work

Bad Sex and Consent.Elise Woodard - 2022 - In David Boonin, Handbook of Sexual Ethics. Palgrave. pp. 301--324.
Your word against mine: the power of uptake.Lucy McDonald - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3505-3526.
Autonomy as Non‐alienation, Autonomy as Sovereignty, and Politics.David Enoch - 2021 - Journal of Political Philosophy 30 (2):143-165.
Against “Democratizing AI”.Johannes Himmelreich - 2023 - AI and Society 38 (4):1333-1346.

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