Abstract

This dissertation is an attempt to better understand certain aspects of the theoretical structure of contemporary 'contractarian' and/or 'contractualist' accounts of morality. I begin by identifying contractarian accounts of morality as foundational theories; that is to say, as theories occupying a middle ground between 'first-order' and 'meta' ethics. I claim that all prominent examples of contemporary contractarianism---to be found, for example, in the works of K. Baier, D. Gauthier, G. R. Grice, G. Harman, J. Mackie, J. Rawls, and T. M. Scanlon---belong to this class of 'foundational' theories, unified and defined by the purpose of providing a philosophical account of what it is that makes for moral relevance and moral force. ;For the remainder of the dissertation, I focus my attention primarily on the last two of the authors named above. I identify Rawls' notion of "reflective equilibrium" as exemplifying a generally "coherentist" conception of the task of moral philosophy, which views moral theory in general, and contractarian theory in particular, as fulfilling at once both a descriptive and a prescriptive function. On the one hand, I put pressure on the idea "reflective equilibrium" can consistently allow existing moral intuitions, judgments and responses to control the evaluation of moral theories. On the other hand, I argue that contractarian methodology has a certain revisionist momentum built in, which sits uncomfortably with "conservative" conceptions of theoretic adequacy. ;This brings me to Scanlon's "contractualism." I argue that in his "Contractualism and Utilitarianism," Scanlon upholds an ideal of moral theorizing according to which theories of the nature and foundations of morality must have critical power vis-a-vis existing moral practices; and that this commitment is in conflict, both in this article and in Scanlon's subsequent What We Owe to Each Other, with the determinative role that Scanlon accords to "fit" with phenomenological aspects of "moral experience" in the justification and evaluation of moral theories. ;Though this dissertation's discussion of the tension between contractarian methodology and the "coherence" approach to moral inquiry is situated particularly in the conceptual landscape underlying the thinking of Rawls and Scanlon, I take it to be of broader significance, both to an understanding of foundational moral theories centrally employing the idealized contract or "rational agreement," and to the ongoing discussion regarding the proper criteria for theory-evaluation and theory-choice in moral philosophy