Abstract

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls introduced a method of justification, the method of reflective equilibrium, which used moral judgments to develop a "coherent view" to justify moral theory with its "mutual support." Critics, in various ways, have challenged this method based on its reliance on moral judgments. In this dissertation, I defend the method of reflective equilibrium, with its use of moral judgments, against criticisms by making clear its theoretical presuppositions and their implications. I also argue that anyone who accepts these presuppositions elsewhere must accept the method of reflective equilibrium in ethics. ;I trace the development of this method of justification from Rawls' dissertation to A Theory of Justice. Focusing on references in the earlier work to rational consensus and in the later works to Goodman, Quine and White, I argue that this method is non-foundationalist and holistic. Emphasizing the holistic quality of the method, I argue, following Norman Daniels' lead, that the method must include not only moral judgments but all judgments, moral and non-moral, which could be brought to bear on moral theory development. Expanding on Larry Laudan's position that scientific theory selection is determined by the purpose of theory, I argue that, given the interconnections of theories, a theory can be judged, in part, by its effect on other theories' abilities to fulfill their purposes. This position coupled with the underdetermination of scientific theories justifies, I argue, moral judgments influencing scientific theory selection. ;Responding to critics, I focus on the non-foundational and holistic nature of the method to justify the inclusion of moral judgments and to argue that such inclusion is unproblematic. Appealing to non-foundationalism and holism cannot answer R. M. Hare's criticism because, I argue, Hare's criticism stems from his acceptance of the meaning/application distinction which is grounded in the rejection of holism. My thesis is that those who accept non-foundationalism and holism elsewhere ought also accept the method of reflective equilibrium in ethics. Because Hare's rejection of holism underlies his objection to the method of reflective equilibrium, I do not respond to his criticism but explain how it presupposes a rejection of holism.