Abstract

This dissertation centers around a close analysis of John Rawls' method of reflective equilibrium. After an introductory chapter, I begin in Chapter Two by giving an historical account of contemporary meta-ethics. Chapter Three begins with a description of Rawls' early discussion of methodology in "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics." I then turn to the method of reflective equilibrium as it is described by Rawls in A Theory of Justice. In Chapter Four I examine portions of the work of W. V. O. Quine, Morton White, and Nelson Goodman which are relevant to the understanding of Rawls' methodology. In Chapter Five I defend the method against several common criticisms: that it is a form of intuitionism; that it is subjectivist; that it is ethnocentrist; and finally, that it provides no substantial justification for the principles it yields. Following Norman Daniels I argue that these criticisms hold only again "narrow" reflective equilibrium. In "wide" reflective equilibrium one seeks a coherence among considered judgements, moral principles and relevant background theories. The nature of the justification provided is further clarified in the light of the epistemological background theories discussed in Chapter Four. This holistic account of justification leads to a difficulty, however. In order to avoid the charge that such an equilibrium is "rigged", it must be subject to revision at all levels. This means that the method might require the revision or rejection of scientific background theories in the light of strongly held moral convictions. In Chapter Six I show how the picture of science required by the method is not at odds with various conceptions of science arrived at by contemporary philosophers of science, most notably Thomas Kuhn. In Chapter Seven I show further that reflective equilibrium is remarkably similar to the accounts of scientific rationality proposed by Nicholas Maxwell and Larry Laudan. Finally, I argue in the conclusion that, contrary to the descriptions given by Rawls and Daniels, reflective equilibrium must not be construed as a decision procedure. While decisions are final, reflective equilibrium must be continually open to revision.