The thesis of theory-Laden observation in the light of cognitive psychology

Philosophy of Science 68 (2):203-217 (2001)
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze a philosophical question (neutrality vs. theory-ladenness of observation) taking into consideration the empirical results of Cognitive Psychology (theories of perception). This is an important debate because the objectivity of science is at stake. In the Philosophy of Science there are two main positions with regard to observation, those of C. Hempel and N. R. Hanson. In the Philosophy of Mind there are also two important contrasting positions, those of J. Fodor and Paul M. Churchland. I will analyze the consequences of recent theories of perception and vision developed within Cognitive Science for classical epistemological theses about observation

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10.1086/392873

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Anna Estany
Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona

Citations of this work

Ostensive Learnability as a Test Criterion for Theory-Neutral Observation Concepts.Gerhard Schurz - 2015 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):139-153.
Aesthetics and cognitive science.Dustin Stokes - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):715-733.

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References found in this work

Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1969 - New York: Columbia University Press.
Patterns of Discovery.Norwood R. Hanson, A. D. Ritchie & Henryk Mehlberg - 1960 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (40):346-349.
Philosophy of Natural Science.Carl G. Hempel - 1967 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):70-72.
How does a brain build a cognitive code?Stephen Grossberg - 1980 - Psychological Review 87 (1):1-51.

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