Some Ambiguities in Tabatabai’s reading of the Proof of Truthful ones

Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 12 (48):147-159 (2011)
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Abstract

The proof of truthful ones, which is taken as the most forceful argument in this regard, has different readings. Tabatabai has offered the last one. Explaining this reading, we proceed to mention some critical points. The first one is that the rejection of objective reality doesn’t lead to the approval of “objective reality”; it just invokes a reality which can be a conceptual being. The second point is that in the last premise of the proof which is theoretical, “all reality” is understood as the “the Absolute Reality”. This issue is not only inconsistent with his claim, but also calls the proof into question. The third one is that assuming the validity of his reading in proving absolute reality and its being in itself, it lacks a clear explanation to prove its being for-itself. And finally, mediation of the world and the passing world in his reading of the proof, while all its mediations supposed to be merely ontological, doesn’t meet with the title of the proof: truthful ones. Thus, even if we accept the validity of his reading and its ability to prove the absolute reality and its being in itself and for itself, it cannot be called the proof of truthful ones.

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