Language Dependence in Philosophy of Science and Formal Epistemology

Abstract

Suppose we have two false hypotheses H1 and H2. Sometimes, we would like to be able to say that H1 is closer to the truth than H2 (e.g., Newton’s hypothesis vs. Ptolemy’s).

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Branden Fitelson
Northeastern University

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