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Separability assumptions in scoring-rule-based arguments for probabilism
Abstract
- In decision theory, an agent is deciding how to value a gamble that results in different outcomes in different states. Each outcome gets a utility value for the agent.Author Profiles
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2009-06-12
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2009-06-12
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