Abstract

In this paper I argue that the normative moral theory embedded in Hume's works is an act-deontological theory. After providing a conceptual framework for my discussion, I show that in Book III, Part i, Section 1 of the *Treatise* Hume rejected the thesis that there are synthetic a priori constitutive rules of moral obligation. Next I show that the positive evidence indicates that Hume accepted an act-deontological theory of moral value. Since constitutive moral rules need not be synthetic a priori propositions, and since it might be suggested that Hume proposed rules defining moral obligation, I show that the rules Hume proposed were fundamentally rules of nonmoral obligation. I conclude with a brief examination of "Of the Standard of Taste." Since Hume held that ethical and aesthetic theories are on a par, evidence that Hume accepted an act-deontological theory of aesthetic value will tend to confirm my contention that he also accepted an act-deontological theory of moral value.