A Dilemma for Non‐Analytic Naturalism

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):228-247 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In recent years, an impressive research program has developed around non-analytic reductions of the normative. Nevertheless, non-analytic naturalists face a damning dilemma: either they need to give the same reductive analysis for epistemic and practical reasons, or they can give a different analyses by treating epistemic and practical reasons as a species of the larger genus, reasonhood. Since, for example, a desire-based account of epistemic reasons is implausible, the reductionist must opt for the latter. Yet, if the desire-based account of practical reasons is merely a species of the larger genus, then, due to a violation of irreflexivity, the reduction fails.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 107,200

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Luck and Reasons.Spencer Paulson - 2024 - Episteme 21 (3):1064-1078.
Putting particularism in its place.Joshua Gert - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):312-324.
Grounding the Domains of Reasons.Stephanie Leary - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):137-152.
Epistemic instrumentalism, permissibility, and reasons for belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting, Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 260-280.
Are Epistemic Reasons Ever Reasons to Promote?Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (3):353-360.
An Epistemic Case for Empathy.Justin Steinberg - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):47-71.
Motivating Reason to Slow the Factive Turn in Epistemology.J. Drake - 2017 - In Veli Mitova, The Factive Turn in Epistemology. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-22.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-12-18

Downloads
141 (#169,899)

6 months
19 (#181,207)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Andrew T. Forcehimes
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

References found in this work

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon (ed.) - 1998 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

View all 64 references / Add more references