Practical Conflict, Realism and Character

Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania (1990)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Although no one denies that persons experience practical conflict, many philosophers deny the existence of genuine moral conflict. This dissertation argues that a proper understanding of practical conflict places a heavy burden on anyone wishing to deny the existence of genuine moral dilemmas. ;The structure of the argument is essentially transcendental. Specifically, after detailing a realist conception of situations of practical conflict, I consider the plight of Captain Vere in Melville's Billy Budd, Sailor. Using this character, and some hypothetical variants, I argue that only by accepting a restricted realist conception of practical conflict can we adequately explain and understand the evaluative judgments that we ordinarily and naturally make about agents and their circumstances. In particular, accepting a realist conception of practical conflict is necessary for adequately capturing and explaining our understanding of an agent's character, deliberations, and emotions. Furthermore, since the realism I advocate entails a realist view about reasons for action, I conclude that a realist view of reasons for action must be true. ;The concluding chapter argues that acceptance of a realist conception of practical conflict places upon opponents of genuine practical conflict and moral dilemmas an extraordinary burden: Opponents of genuine conflict must argue that rational solutions to experiences of practical conflict always exist, and that agents not finding such solutions are ignorant or mistaken. I claim that sometimes neither characterization is correct. Specifically, I argue that those explanations incorrectly interpret experiencing conflict as merely idiosyncratic and symptomatic of an ill-prepared practical agent or undeveloped character. Furthermore, I suggest that those explanations are inconsistent with the realism upon which our evaluative judgments rest and to which we are necessarily committed. Hence, I conclude that only at the expense of distorting our experience of the moral world and making it unintelligible, can one oppose the existence of genuine conflict

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,369

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-06

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references