Do Constructive Empiricists See Paramecia Too?

Prolegomena 13 (2):291-302 (2014)
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Abstract

According to Bas van Fraassen, a postulated entity which can only be detected by means of some instrument should not be considered observable. In this paper I argue that (1) this is not correct; (2) someone can be a constructive empiricist, adhering to van Fraassen’s famous anti-realist position, even admitting that many entities only detectable with a microscope are observable. The case of the paramecium, a very well-known single-celled organism, is particularly instructive in this respect. I maintain that we actually observe paramecia and not just detect them, contrary to what van Fraassen claims. As a matter of fact, even if we can only perceive these protozoans by using a microscope, we are in condition to know that the relevant counterfactual conditions (like the ones Bueno proposed in 2011) are met. Moreover, paramecia satisfy observability and existence criteria proposed by Buekens (1999) and Ghins (2005). But admitting paramecia and the like among the observables does not threaten Constructive Empiricism, for there will always be a line between observables and unobservables on which van Fraassen’s anti-realism can rest.

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Alessio Gava
Federal University of Minas Gerais (PhD)

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Representing and Intervening.Ian Hacking - 1987 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 92 (2):279-279.
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