Abstract

The value in Hartmann’s point of view can be watched from the perspective of some heteronymous plans - an ideal one, which would be “the modality of existence”, and a real one, which would be “the modality of knowing” the value. In Hartmann’s expression we deal with “the absolute character” 1 of values and “the apriority of knowing the values”. It’s interfering here the problem of the validity of values. The question is if the existence of values is reduced to their validity, or if they exist without the dependence of the real states of the world. This validity, for Hartmann, is strictly referring to the second plan, the real one, which is dealing with values. The values are valid “for” – we have here the connection with the existing- but they have their own “world” beside this nip with reality that we call unbiased 2 . The validity of value is aprioristic, no matter the appreciation - like one “pure subjective”, arbitrary - the apriority of value is not depending of some constrain and converge at the level of the logical schemes of thinking. In the general conception of Hartmann’s philosophy the problem of value is diminishing in the analysis of the distinction between the theory of knowledge plan, which is aiming at the subject-object domain, and the ontological one, represented by the relation objective - trans-objective. Although the philosophical analysis will be done from the perspective of the theory of knowledge domain of the relation subject-object, the problem that will concern mostly Hartman will be the objective - trans-objective report seen from the angle of one “critic ontology”, trying to solve the problem of the report between general and specific in the way of being of the axiological structure