Abstract

This book examines the question of how ethics can be a science according to Aristotle. It aims to assess the cognitive status of statements concerning matters of conduct. The author begins with a study of the Platonic background, arguing that Aristotle rejects Plato's claim that ethics can be a subject of exact scientific knowledge, as this is understood by Plato. He then turns to a discussion of the goals of ethics as conceived by Aristotle, arguing that even though ethics aims at concrete actions, it has a cognitive basis. The parallel with productive sciences such as medicine is appropriately and effectively developed. In the next three chapters, an exhaustive study is made of the meaning of "exact" and "inexact" as applied by Aristotle to various types of statements. The analysis shows that owing to the ultimate goal of ethics, concrete action, some inexactness is ineliminable from practical science generally. Such a conclusion is thought by Aristotle to be counter to Platonic "essentialism" in ethics. The type of inexactness in ethics is then compared to the Aristotelian concept of "being for the most part." The conclusion reached is that "being for the most part" for Aristotle does not unqualifiedly exclude the possibility of demonstration. Accordingly, the way demonstration functions in ethics is next made the focus of the investigation. It is argued that, with certain qualifications, demonstrations "for the most part" fall within the scope of the Aristotelian approach. Just as demonstrations "for the most part" can be applied to a science of nature so can they be applied to a science of ethics. Insofar as ethics is a science, it must rest on the knowledge of universal truths as uncovered in demonstrations. The concluding chapter of this book argues that despite Aristotle's nuanced appreciation of the limitations of the application of universal truth to particular circumstances, he does not forego his commitment to the scientific nature of ethics.