Rationality and the Bayesian paradigm

Journal of Economic Methodology 22 (3):312-334 (2015)
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Abstract

It is argued that, contrary to a rather prevalent view within economic theory, rationality does not imply Bayesianism. The note begins by defining these terms and justifying the choice of these definitions, proceeds to survey the main justification for this prevalent view, and concludes by highlighting its weaknesses

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Citations of this work

On the consistency of choice.Ola Mahmoud - 2017 - Theory and Decision 83 (4):547-572.

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References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (trans. Pears and McGuinness).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1921 - New York,: Routledge. Edited by Luciano Bazzocchi & P. M. S. Hacker.
The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - 1925 - London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Edited by R. B. Braithwaite.
A Treatise on Probability.John Maynard Keynes - 1921 - London,: Macmillan & co..

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