The Expressivist Theory of Punishment Defended

Law and Philosophy 34 (6):601-631 (2015)
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Abstract

Expressivist theories of punishment received largely favorable treatment in the 1980s and 1990s. Perhaps predictably, the 2000s saw a slew of critical rejections of the view. It is now becoming evident that, while several objections to expressivism have found their way into print, three concerns are proving particularly popular. So the time is right for a big picture assessment. What follows is an attempt to show that these three dominant objections are not decisive reasons to give up the most plausible forms of the view. Moreover, in addition to the three common objections, expressivism has an acknowledged question mark concerning whether the value of punitive expression outweighs its drawbacks. Here I also map out some promising avenues that the expressivist can take to answer this question

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Joshua Glasgow
Sonoma State University

Citations of this work

Standing to Punish the Disadvantaged.Benjamin S. Yost - 2023 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 17 (3):711-733.
The Nature of Punishment: Reply to Wringe.Nathan Hanna - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (5):969-976.
What Is Punishment?Frej Klem Thomsen - 2024 - In Jesper Ryberg, The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Punishment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Should Law track Morality?Re’em Segev - 2017 - Criminal Justice Ethics 36 (2):205-223.

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