Hedonic pluralism

Philosophical Studies 48 (1):49 - 55 (1985)
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Abstract

Hedonic pluralism is the thesis that 'pleasure' cannot be given a single, all-embracing definition. In this paper I criticize the reasoning people use to support this thesis and suggest some plausible all-encompassing analyses that easily avoid the kinds of objections people raise to all-encompassing analyses.

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Irwin Goldstein
Davidson College

Citations of this work

Reasons and the Good.Roger Crisp - 2006 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.
Hedonism reconsidered.Roger Crisp - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):619–645.
The feels good theory of pleasure.Aaron Smuts - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):241-265.
The good life: A defense of attitudinal hedonism.Fred Feldman - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):604-628.
Pleasure.Leonard D. Katz - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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