A Logic for Conditional Local Strategic Reasoning

Journal of Logic, Language and Information 31 (2):167-188 (2022)
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Abstract

We consider systems of rational agents who act and interact in pursuit of their individual and collective objectives. We study and formalise the reasoning of an agent, or of an external observer, about the expected choices of action of the other agents based on their objectives, in order to assess the reasoner’s ability, or expectation, to achieve their own objective. To formalize such reasoning we extend Pauly’s Coalition Logic with three new modal operators of conditional strategic reasoning, thus introducing the Logic for Local Conditional Strategic Reasoning \. We provide formal semantics for the new conditional strategic operators in concurrent game models, introduce the matching notion of bisimulation for each of them, prove bisimulation invariance and Hennessy–Milner property for each of them, and discuss and compare briefly their expressiveness. Finally, we also propose systems of axioms for each of the basic operators of \ and for the full logic.

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Valentin Goranko
Stockholm University

Citations of this work

A Logic for Conditional Local Strategic Reasoning.Valentin Goranko & Fengkui Ju - 2022 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 31 (2):167-188.

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