In Defense of Psychologism About Reasons

In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 33-50 (2016)
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Abstract

What we belief with justification, we generally believe for a reason. But what are epistemic reasons? In this paper, I defend psychologism about epistemic reasons against two important challenges.

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original Grajner, Martin (2016) "In Defense of Psychologism About Reasons". In Grajner, Martin, Schmechtig, Pedro, Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals, pp. 33-50: De Gruyter (2016)

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Martin Grajner
Technische Universität Dresden

Citations of this work

Reasons and ‘because’.Wolfgang Freitag - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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