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Epistemic commitments, epistemic agency and practical reasons
Philosophical Issues 23 (1):343-362 (2013)
Abstract
In this paper, I raise two questions about epistemic commitments, and thus, indirectly, about our epistemic agency. Can we rationally defend such commitments when challenged to do so? And if so, how?Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement.Chris Ranalli & Thirza Lagewaard - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (12):e12886.
Deep Disagreement (Part 2): Epistemology of Deep Disagreement.Chris Ranalli & Thirza Lagewaard - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (12):e12887.
What’s so bad about echo chambers?Christopher Ranalli & Finlay Malcolm - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
The fundamental model of deep disagreements.Victoria Lavorerio - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):416-431.
References found in this work
Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge.William P. Alston - 1989 - Cornell University Press.
Fear of knowledge: against relativism and constructivism.Paul Boghossian - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.
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