Abstract

I examine the history of the model of economic man, focusing on why Smith, Ricardo, Mill, Jevons, Walras, and Pareto, chose not to extend the scope of their respective "economic men" into social and moral behavior. In his Manual, Pareto developed a model of logical conduct, known to economists as the "theory of choice," which he applied to man's economic behavior. In addition, in his Trattato, he developed a model of non-logical conduct, less known to economists, which he applied to man's social and moral behavior. I examine why Pareto, after having developed the theory of choice, and recognizing its potential for expanding of the scope of the model of economic man, still rejected applying the theory of choice to man's social and moral behavior. Pareto's model of non-logical conduct, which explained man's social and moral behavior as caused by non-logical impulses of instinct and sentiment, was consistent with turn of the century instinct psychology. Secondary commentators, under the influence of Behaviorism, have misrepresented or ignored the biological nature of Pareto's model of non-logical conduct. I interpret Pareto's model of non-logical conduct in terms of turn of the century instinct psychology, which incorporated a repertoire of man's innate predispositions, and a "theory of sentiment," as part of their explanation of individuals' social and moral behavior. I characterize turn of the century instinct psychology as prescient of modern evolutionary points of view concerning man's social behavior, e.g., ethological and sociobiological explanations of altruism. Economists, having recognized the import of modern evolutionary biology, suggest limitations on the scope of the theory of choice and acknowledge Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments as prescient of the modern evolutionary point of view. Economists have failed to recognize Pareto's Trattato as prescient of a modern evolutionary point of view. This dissertation makes up for that deficit in the history of economic thought