Closing the Door on Limited-Risk Open Theism

Faith and Philosophy 31 (4):475-485 (2014)
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Abstract

This paper argues against a version of open theism defended by Gregory Boyd, which we call “limited risk,” according to which God could guarantee at creation at least the fulfillment of His most central purpose for the world: that of having a “people for himself.” We show that such a view depends on the assumption that free human decisions can be “statistically determined” within certain percentage ranges, and that this assumption is inconsistent with open theists’ commitment to a libertarian conception of human freedom.

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Foreknowledge and Free Will.Linda Zagzebski - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:online.
Elucidating open theism.Joshua R. Sijuwade - 2023 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 94 (2):151-175.

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