Is the Knowability Paradox Really the Paradox It Is Taken to Be?

Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 57 (1):39-49 (2024)
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Abstract

I first present the rudiments of the knowability paradox and state it in the usual formal style. Second, I present my intuition that it is not a paradox at all: it does not involve the contradiction it allegedly implies. Third, I point out where the argument for the paradox goes wrong.

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10.1163/24689300-bja10052

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