Abstract

Ostensibly, Husserl’s work doesn’t seem to allow for a conceptualization of a properly collective memory, i.e. a shared memory, common to all members of a somewhat tightly unified group. Indeed, Husserl’s view of a collective, at least the one most often presented in his works, appears to be one of a collective equivalent either to an “anyone and everyone” or to an aggregate sum of parts, to a loosely unified composite. All memory of members of such a collective would itself be adjusted accordingly. However, Husserl also develops an idea of a collective, the “personality of a higher order” – as well as an idea of correlative social acts – which might present good candidates for authentic collectives and collective acts, including memories. This paper will attempt to clarify the constitution of said collectives and acts based on the model of Husserlian generativity understood stricto sensu and “from within”.