- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
A note on pretense and co-reference
Philosophical Studies 149 (3):395 - 400 (2010)
Abstract
Anna Pautz has recently argued that the pretense theory of thought about fiction cannot explain how two people can count as thinking about the same fictional character. This is based on conflating pretending and the serious thought that can be based on pretend. With this distinction in place, her objections are groundless.Author's Profile
Other Versions
No versions found
My notes
Similar books and articles
Pretense and fiction-directed thought.Michael R. Hicks - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1549-1573.
Do you really hate Tom Brady? Pretense and emotion in sport.Joseph G. Moore - 2019 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 46 (2):244-260.
Failed Reference and Feigned Reference: Much ado about Nothing.Kent Bach - 1985 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 25-26 (1):359-374.
Failed Reference and Feigned Reference.Kent Bach - 1985 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 25 (1):359-374.
Pretense Theory and the Imported Background.Jeffrey Goodman - 2011 - Open Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):22.
Failed Reference and Feigned Reference.Kent Bach - 1985 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 25 (1):359-374.
Fictional coreference as a problem for the pretense theory.Anna Bjurman Pautz - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (2):147 - 156.
Two Varieties of Literary Imagination: Metaphor, Fiction, and Thought Experiments.Elisabeth Camp - 2009 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 33 (1):107-130.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-03-28
Downloads
154 (#147,560)
6 months
18 (#155,753)
2009-03-28
Downloads
154 (#147,560)
6 months
18 (#155,753)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Pretense and fiction-directed thought.Michael R. Hicks - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1549-1573.
Fictional Characters and Their Discontents: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics of Fictional Entities.Shamik Chakravarty - 2021 - Dissertation, Lingnan University
References found in this work
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Mimesis as make-believe: on the foundations of the representational arts.Kendall L. Walton - 1990 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts.Kendall L. Walton - 1990 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 49 (2):161-166.
Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts.Kendall L. WALTON - 1990 - Philosophy 66 (258):527-529.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-667477cd97-qfrlh dc2