Abstract

There are striking similarities in the ways philosophers use to speak about concepts and properties. For example, it is commonly said that concepts and properties are ‘predicated’ of things – which, in turn, are said to ‘exemplify’ those concepts or properties. Concepts as well as properties are assumed to have ‘instances’ and ‘extensions’ and to be the semantical values of adjectives like ‘red,’ ‘round,’ and so on. Even metaphysically, concepts and properties seem to have much in common. Thus, both have been characterized as universals capable of having multiple instances. In this essay, I would like to explore the conspicuous interrelations between concepts and properties from the viewpoint of a pragmatist approach which aims to explain phenomena of mind and meaning in terms of the actions and practices of (social) beings. To this end, I shall discuss the probably most influential development of this program, namely Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning as use, and probe the extent to which this theory is capable of illuminating the ontological nexus between concepts and properties.