Abstract

In this dissertation I examine how the concept of "nature" and its oppositions, "unnatural" and "artificial", shape ethical debates concerning technology, science, and the human condition. Investigating these concepts is important for two reasons: first, the category of "nature" is widely and effectively, though often subtly, employed in ethical analysis; second, recent scholarship has shed doubt on whether the category of "nature" and the distinctions between it and its oppositions are sound. My thesis is that the category of "nature" is inconsistently applied and the sharp distinction between it and its oppositions is unsound, unless the distinctions are construed so narrowly as to risk being arbitrary and irrelevant. Moral debates which appeal to them, then, rely on a conceptual mistake. ;In this dissertation I focus on three specific moral issues: Reproductive technology: Some feminists criticize male-dominated society for using "artificial" means to co-opt women's "natural" procreative ability, and admonish women to reject technology in favor of "natural" childbirth and to reassert their essential femaleness. I argue that "natural" childbirth is itself a technological practice and the desire for "natural" childbirth the result of traditional, cultural ideals of women as mothers; Biology and sexual orientation: Gay rights proponents claim that biology has proven homosexuality is "natural." Gay rights opponents disagree, but claim even if homosexuality is biological, it should be considered a treatable pathology. I argue that the use of "nature" on both sides is inconsistent and demonstrates that the concept is often a reflection of cultural biases, rather than a reflection of objective reality; Euthanasia: The permissibility of "passive" euthanasia is related to the perceived degree of artificiality in which an incurable, suffering patient lives--the removal of "artificial" treatments is thought to lead to a "natural" death. I argue that the idea of "natural" death relies on a faulty understanding of the human body as "natural", and that the belief that removing machines is a passive act relies on a faulty assessment of the moral relevance of "artificiality." ;In conclusion, I argue that ethical analyses should not appeal to the category of "nature."