Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2011)
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Abstract

Paul Horwich presents a bold new interpretation of Wittgenstein's later work. He argues that it is Wittgenstein's radically anti-theoretical metaphilosophy - and not his identification of the meaning of a word with its use - that underpins his discussions of specific issues concerning language, the mind, mathematics, knowledge, art, and religion

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Paul Horwich
New York University

Citations of this work

Philosophical Progress, Skepticism, and Disagreement.Annalisa Coliva & Louis Doulas - 2024 - In Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. New York, NY: Routledge.
The many (yet few) faces of deflationism.Jeremy Wyatt - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly (263):362-382.
Would Disagreement Undermine Progress?Finnur Dellsén, Insa Lawler & James Norton - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (3):139-172.
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

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