The 'old evidence' problem

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (4):547-555 (1991)
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Abstract

This paper offers an answer to Glymour's ‘old evidence’ problem for Bayesian confirmation theory, and assesses some of the objections, in particular those recently aired by Chihara, that have been brought against that answer. The paper argues that these objections are easily dissolved, and goes on to show how the answer it proposes yields an intuitively satisfactory analysis of a problem recently discussed by Maher. Garber's, Niiniluoto's and others’ quite different answer to Glymour's problem is considered and rejected, and the paper concludes with some brief reflections on the prediction/accommodation issue.

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Colin Howson
Last affiliation: London School of Economics

Citations of this work

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Subjective and objective confirmation.Patrick Maher - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (2):149-174.
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References found in this work

Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
Theory and Evidence.Clark N. Glymour - 1980 - Princeton University Press.
Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1980 - Ethics 93 (3):613-615.
Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1982 - Erkenntnis 18 (1):105-130.
Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1981 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (3):314-318.

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