Almeder's unknowable defeater defeated

Abstract

Robert Almeder has argued1 that three “fourth conditions” for nondefectiveness of knowledge justification claims, proposed in the recent literature,2 are essentially similar, require modification in order to eliminate the possibility of an unknowable defeater, and, so modified, render attainment of non-basic factual knowledge impossible. Although I believe there are objections to be raised against his exposition and reduction of the three proposed fourth conditions, I wish only to raise some doubts about the supposed necessity of the modifications and then to argue against his claim that, so modified, the result is too stringent.

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References found in this work

A proposed definition of propositional knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (16):471-482.
Knowledge without paradox.Robert G. Meyers & Kenneth Stern - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (6):147-160.
The Fourth Condition of Knowledge: A Defense.Keith Lehrer - 1970 - Review of Metaphysics 24 (1):122 - 128.
Knowledge, Causality, and Justification.Marshall Swain - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (11):291-300.

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