Abstract

In this chapter, I argue that Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition provides us with some crucial prerequisites for an ethical analysis of dealing with migration in the Western world. His consideration of the inevitable dependency of individuals on recognition, particularly the respect for rights and the esteem of achievements, is crucial for an evaluation of current practices and the detection of social pathologies. However, there are some pitfalls in this approach that can be illustrated through the application of his theory to migration. First, Honneth assumes a teleology of recognition. He, thus, cannot answer the question why differential treatments of various groups emerge ; he does not take into account specific power relations; and he cannot target limits of social inclusion. Second, he assumes reciprocity in recognition and is unable to tackle the question of asymmetries between myself and the Other, but also between members of a society and individuals who want to immigrate in this society. Third, I want to challenge the idea that it is the full-blown person or their achievements, which is to be recognized. Instead, I argue that vulnerability should be at the center of recognition, particularly of solidarity. Drawing from Judith Butler, I argue that the structural recognizability of vulnerability helps us to rectify these pitfalls. However, in turn, Butler tends to leave idle the basis for a critical evaluation of current practices. This becomes visible through an analysis of her conceptualization of solidarity. Thus, I propose to complement her approach with the strategy of immanent critique, which has been developed within the critical theory.