Towards a “New Epistemology”: Yuk Hui’s Recursivity and Contingency

Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 59 (3):220-233 (2022)
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Abstract

The article critically examines the project of the Hong Kong philosopher Yuk Hui to create organological and cosmotechnical epistemology. To open up the prospect of a “new epistemology” of this kind, Hui carries out a historical and rational reconstruction of the 250-year movement of European thought – from German idealism to second-order cybernetics. In all these theories and approaches, he reveals the key role of the recursive-contingent ligament. But what has happened in recent decades that prompted the author to reassemble Wiener’s non-trivial cybernetic machines and propose a cosmotechnical strategy for moving towards a “new epistemology”? How justified is it that, in constructing his axiocosmotechnics, he turns to the philosophy of the East, ancient and modern? The author of the article attempts to provide answers to these and other questions.

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