Abstract

The elenchus, Socrates' method in Plato's 'early' dialogues, consists of Socrates' eliciting a definition of some moral term from the interlocutor, then proceeding to demonstrate that that definition has consequences at odds with other things the interlocutor believes. Socrates' goal is standardly to force the interlocutor to abandon his definition. But this relies on the secondary beliefs' having some special status, for otherwise, it would be open to the interlocutor to cling to his definition and abandon his secondary beliefs. Another problem lies in the fact that, in a few cases where the elenchus is featured, Socrates actually claims to have proved his position true. One problem, then, is to account for the special status of the secondary beliefs; the other is to explain how a method which, on the face of it, is capable only of delivering the verdict that a particular definition, $\delta$, either is or is not consistent with a particular set of secondary beliefs, $\Sigma$, can also serve to render a verdict on the truth of $\delta$. I argue that neither of these problems is soluble unless consistency can be shown to be sufficient for truth. ;Consistency is sufficient for truth only on a Coherence Theory of Truth. I argue that Socrates presupposes, and Plato subscribes to, just such a theory; this explains why they both think that there is only one fully consistent set of beliefs, and that truth consists in membership in that set. The Coherence Theory, I argue, is a central part of Platonic metaphysics, and is reasonably near the surface in some of the 'middle' and 'late' dialogues. Hints of the Coherence Theory of Truth are present even in some of the 'early' dialogues. I try to show how attributing such a theory to Plato illuminates Socrates' practice. In conclusion, I suggest that recognizing the role this theory plays in Plato's metaphysics helps to solve ancillary but related problems in Plato scholarship, such as what to make of Socratic ignorance and how to construe Plato's resolution of Meno's paradox