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Kahneman, Tversky, and Kahneman-Tversky: three ways of thinking
Thinking and Reasoning 30 (4):531-547 (2024)
Abstract
This homage to Danny Kahneman and Amos Tversky describes how each of them thought about psychology. It outlines the principal results of their collaborative research, which was their most original and most influential. Why? In search of an explanation it examines their joint thinking during their collaboration.Author's Profile
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References found in this work
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.
On the psychology of prediction.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1973 - Psychological Review 80 (4):237-251.
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1983 - Psychological Review 90 (4):293-315.
Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):317-370.
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