Representation and Regress

Husserl Studies 33 (1):19-43 (2017)
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Abstract

I defend a Husserlian account of self-consciousness against representationalist accounts: higher-order representationalism and self-representationalism. Of these, self-representationalism is the harder to refute since, unlike higher-order representationalism, it does not incur a regress of self-conscious acts. However, it incurs a regress of intentional contents. I consider, and reject, five strategies for avoiding this regress of contents. I conclude that the regress is inherent to self-representationalism. I close by showing how this incoherence obtrudes in what must be the self-representationalist’s account of the phenomenology of experience.

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Instantaneous self-deception.Maiya Jordan - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (2):176-201.
Self-awareness and self-deception.Jordan Maiya - 2017 - Dissertation, Mcgill University

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References found in this work

Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (282):602-604.
For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not.Dan Zahavi & Uriah Kriegel - 2016 - In Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Andreas Elpidorou & Walter Hopp, Philosophy of mind and phenomenology. New York: Routledge. pp. 36-53.
A theory of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere, The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.

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