Intuitive and heuristic judgment - Different processes? Presentation of a German version of the rational-experiential inventory and of new self-report scales of heuristic use

Abstract

In this paper we present a German scale assessing intuitive and rational processing (a translation of the Rational-Experiential Inventory [REI]; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj & Heier, 1996) as well as new scales assessing the use and evaluation of various persuasion heuristics. The German REI is shown to have good item characteristics and high reliability and to replicate the two-dimensional structure of the original scale with its subscales faith in intuition and need for cognition. Both dimensions are independent of social desirability, and correlations with various personality traits speak to their construct validity. Further results indicate differences in the self-reported use of different persuasion heuristics contingent on the need for cognition and faith in intuition that hint at a differentiation of associative and rule based heuristic processes. In addition, the correlational patterns suggest a conceptual distinction between heuristic and intuitive processing.

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Johannes Keller
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

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