One of the most debated topics among those who study heuristics is the question of their rationality. The present paper proposes an answer to this question based on the ideas of instrumental rationality and the probabilistic nature of heuristic judgments and decisions. Accordingly, it is argued that the rationality of heuristics is determined by their effectiveness, i.e., their ability to achieve a desired result. At the same time, heuristics do not always produce such a result, but only in a certain (...) number of cases. Therefore, their effectiveness should not be evaluated by the binary logic criterion (effective/ineffective) but by the probabilistic criterion, i.e., by how often they lead to the desired result. Each heuristic has a certain objective probability of achieving such a result, which determines its rationality. However, this probability is mostly unknown to us, so when relying on heuristics, we are likely guided by a subjective perception of it, which serves as a metacognitive cue about the probability of the conclusion obtained with the help of this heuristic. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the relationship between moral heuristics and two types of information processing. To achieve this goal, moral heuristics will be considered in the context of a dual-process theory. Type 1 processes (deliberate) are being defined as consciously controlled and Type 2 processes (intuitive) as those that occur without conscious control. Heuristics are not one of the types of information processing, but a methodor procedure that simplifies information processing for decision-makers. This simplification can be (...) achieved both in deliberate and intuitive ways. Therefore, heuristics can operate at the different levels of the information processing. The level at which heuristics work depends on the heuristic itself, the person (their experience, cognitive qualities, etc.), environment, and problem that needs to be solved. (shrink)