Welfarism

Philosophy Compass 4 (1):82-95 (2009)
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Abstract

Welfarism is the view that morality is centrally concerned with the welfare or well-being of individuals. The division between welfarist and non-welfarist approaches underlies many important disagreements in ethics, but welfarism is neither consistently defined nor well understood. I survey the philosophical work on welfarism, and I offer a suggestion about how the view can be characterized and how it can be embedded in various kinds of moral theory. I also identify welfarism's major rivals, and its major attractions and weaknesses.

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Simon Keller
Victoria University of Wellington

Citations of this work

Welfare and Autonomy under Risk.Pietro Cibinel - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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Artificial Moral Patients: Mentality, Intentionality, and Systematicity.Howard Nye & Tugba Yoldas - 2021 - International Review of Information Ethics 29:1-10.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon (ed.) - 1998 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Principia ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications. Edited by Thomas Baldwin.

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