Abstract

For centuries, philosophers have questioned and debated issues central to the nature of freedom and the voluntary control of human action. Surprisingly, relatively little has been said regarding whether or not believing is a free and/or voluntary activity. In this work, we examine both the relationship between freedom and belief, and voluntary control and belief. We raise questions such as: When, if ever, can we freely and/or voluntarily acquire beliefs? Can freely and/or voluntarily acquired beliefs ever be acquired rationally? And finally: Are there important connections between epistemic justification and the free acquisition of belief? ;In answering the above questions we show that freedom, voluntary control, and rationality are concepts which interact in ways to produce a complex mixture and wide assortment of belief acquisitions. We show that sometimes belief acquisition is voluntary and/or free, and sometimes it is not. Furthermore, we argue that sometimes beliefs which we acquire voluntarily and/or freely are acquired rationally, and other times not. In general, we argue that it is a mistake to claim that all beliefs are acquired voluntarily and/or freely, just as it is a mistake to claim that all beliefs are acquired neither voluntarily nor freely