Believing and willing

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):37-56 (1985)
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Abstract

It is widely held that we can obtain beliefs and withhold believing propositions directly by performing an act of will. This thesis is sometimes identified with the view that believing is a basic act, an act which is under our direct control. Descartes holds that the will is limitless in relation to belief acquisition and that we must be directly responsible for our beliefs, especially our false beliefs, for otherwise we could draw the blasphemous conclusion that God is responsible for them. For Descartes and his followers judgment and assent are acts of the will which may be made both when they ought and when they ought not to be made. They are expressions of freedom of the will and as such we are directly responsible for the beliefs we acquire. Other philosophers who seem to espouse volitionalism include Aquinas, Locke, Kierkegaard, Newman, James, Pieper, Chisholm and Meiland.

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Louis P. Pojman
PhD: Oxford University

Citations of this work

Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
Resolving to believe: Kierkegaard's direct doxastic voluntarism.Z. Quanbeck - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (2):548-574.
On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.
Believing at Will is Possible.Rik Peels - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.

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References found in this work

Problems of the Self.Bernard Williams - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 37 (3):551-551.
Believing at will.Barbara Winters - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (5):243-256.
Essays in Pragmatism.William James & Alburey Castell - 1949 - Philosophy 24 (90):278-279.
What Ought We to Believe? Or the Ethics of Belief Revisited.Jack W. Meiland - 1980 - American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (1):15 - 24.

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