Truth, rightness, and permanent acceptability

Synthese 95 (1):107 - 117 (1993)
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Abstract

Goodman and Elgin want truth to be demoted and rightness to be promoted. In the first part of this paper the main reasons they offer for this reorientation are discussed. Goodman once suggestedthat one construe truth as acceptability that is not subsequently lost, but later he quietly dropped this proposal. In the second part of this paper it is argued that ultimate acceptability is indeed neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for truth.

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Citations of this work

Construction and Worldmaking: the Significance of Nelson Goodman’s Pluralism.Xavier De Donato-Rodríguez - 2009 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 24 (2):213-225.

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References found in this work

Ways of worldmaking.Nelson Goodman - 1978 - Hassocks [Eng.]: Harvester Press.
Of mind and other matters.Nelson Goodman - 1984 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Some Main Problems of Philosophy.George Edward Moore - 1953 - New York: Routledge. Edited by H. D. Lewis.
Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols.B. C. O'Neill - 1971 - Philosophical Quarterly 21 (85):361.
Reconceptions in philosophy and other arts and sciences.Nelson Goodman - 1988 - London: Routledge. Edited by Catherine Z. Elgin.

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