Abstract

Scholars of urban politics and municipal finance have argued that the provision of public services by local governments is inherently inefficient, and that the scope of such services is inherently limited, because cities cannot allocate them through a traditional pricing system. However, these scholars have largely ignored special assessments, a mechanism of raising revenue that allows municipalities to condition the provision of public services and infrastructure improvements on the willingness of residents to pay for them. Historically, special assessments have served as a major source of local governments' revenues. In this paper, our goal is to identify the conditions under which special assessments improve or reduce the efficiency of public services and the responsiveness of local government to citizens. We also examine the political basis for the rise of special assessments in California after Proposition 13. Field interviews with public officials and the consultants they call on to help create special assessments do not leave us sanguine regarding the ability of voters to hold their local governments to account.