A weak symmetry condition for probabilistic measures of confirmation

Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1927-1944 (2018)
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Abstract

This paper presents a symmetry condition for probabilistic measures of confirmation which is weaker than commutativity symmetry, disconfirmation commutativity symmetry but also antisymmetry. It is based on the idea that for any value a probabilistic measure of confirmation can assign there is a corresponding case where degrees of confirmation are symmetric. It is shown that a number of prominent confirmation measures such as Carnap’s difference function, Rescher’s measure of confirmation, Gaifman’s confirmation rate and Mortimer’s inverted difference function do not satisfy this condition and instead exhibit a previously unnoticed and rather puzzling behavior in certain cases of disconfirmation. This behavior also carries over to probabilistic measures of information change, causal strength, explanatory power and coherence.

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Jakob Koscholke
Goethe University Frankfurt

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Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Mind 93 (371):450-455.
A Treatise on Probability.J. M. Keynes - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (2):219-222.
Logical Foundations of Probability.Ernest H. Hutten - 1950 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 16 (3):205-207.

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