Contradictions, Objects, and Belief

In Jean-Yves Béziau & Alexandre Costa-Leite (eds.), Perspectives on Universal Logic. Milan, Italy: Polimetrica (2007)
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Abstract

We show how some model-theoretical devices (local reasoning, modes of presentation, an additional accessibility relation) can be combined in first-order modal logic to formalize the consequence relation that includes de dicto and de re contradictory beliefs. Instead of special ``sense objects'', appearances of objects in an agent's belief are introduced and presented as ordered pairs consisting of an object and an individual constant. A non-classical identity relation is applied. A relation S on the set of possible worlds is introduced, which models possible distortions in an agent's picture of a (real) world. The application of such models in deontic logic is illustrated by a characteristic example. , , , , , , , ,

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original Kovač, Srećko (2007) "Contradictions, Objects, and Belief". In Béziau, Jean-Yves, Costa-Leite, Alexandre, Perspectives on Universal Logic, pp. 417-434: Polimetrica (2007)

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