Abstract

The conceptual distinction between what it is to be a body and what it is to have a body was first construed by the philosophical anthropologist Helmuth Plessner.This article deals with two common problems within the German discourse on the theme.The first derives from a misunderstanding that the 3 categories body, living body, and person signify distinct entities, whilst what Plessner is actually referring to is the various modes in which a person′s life is led. Neither the modes of body nor living body has primacy per se, and the person lives by doubling itself into a public and private person situated in a shared world outside of centric correlations .The second point of contention relates to Plessner′s methodology in developing the distinction between Leib and Körper. He believed in combining a plurality of methods in accordance with the phenomenon, its understanding, and the stances or positionings taken up by living persons. The indeterminacy and unfathomability of persons in the leading of their lives emerges from the variety of their perspectives and changing historical aspects. It is only the invalid extension of these perspectives and aspects to the whole of the future that leads to false promises – to the animal ideologicum who is unable to endure its questionability. The homo absconditus, by contrast, lives in scepticism of positive absolutisms. The questionability of his form of life keeps him open