Reliabilism and circularity

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):111-124 (1996)
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Abstract

How can we ever find out whether our psychological processes are reliable? According to many reliabilists—e.g. Alston, Goldman, Papineau, and Van Cleve —there is no problem: We just use our psychological processes and then arrive at the belief that these very same processes are reliable. If our psychological processes are actually reliable, we can arrive in this way at a justified belief. And, indeed, we can even come to know that they are reliable.

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Markus Lammenranta
University of Helsinki

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