Abstract

Introduction. Modern discussions about free will are reduced to the confrontation between compatibilism and incompatibilism. The desire of the former to connect the free will of the individual with physical conditioning actualizes the problem of responsibility for the moral actions performed by the individual. Theoretical analysis. The main socio-philosophical reflections on liberty and responsibility in the context of the 17th century liberalism theory are analyzed. The concepts of T. Hobbes, J. Locke and B. Spinoza are interpreted through the prism of the rational justification of liberty, understanding the correlation between a person’s choice and his actions. The paradigm of new thinking, created by liberal philosophers, made it possible to assess the meaning of freedom in a fundamentally different way – from the point of view of the interaction between an individual and society. A comparative analysis of the provisions on free will allows us to assert the aggravation of the problem of moral responsibility, caused by the rational awareness of free action criteria. Conclusion. The ideas of classical liberal-thinking philosophers acted as a theoretical foundation in the development of the compatibilism concept, the supporters of which associated freedom with necessity. Thus, we can talk about the continuity outlined back in antiquity – from freedom as a “cognized necessity” to its understanding as free will.