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Context, relevant parts and (lack of) disagreement over taste [Book Review]
Philosophical Studies 156 (3):433-439 (2011)
Abstract
Responds to an argument against relativist semantics advanced in Cappelen and Hawthorne’s Relativism and Monadic Truth.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Disagreement about Taste: Commonality Presuppositions and Coordination.Teresa Marques & Manuel García-Carpintero - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):701-723.
Predicates of personal taste: empirical data.Markus Https://Orcidorg Kneer - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6455-6471.
Denial and retraction: a challenge for theories of taste predicates.Julia Zakkou - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1555-1573.
Contextualism vs. Relativism: More empirical data.Markus Https://Orcidorg Kneer - 2022 - In Jeremy Wyatt, Julia Zakkou & Dan Zeman (eds.), Perspectives on Taste: Aesthetics, Language, Metaphysics, and Experimental Philosophy. Routledge.
Predicates of personal taste, semantic incompleteness, and necessitarianism.Markus Https://Orcidorg Kneer - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (5):981-1011.
References found in this work
Context dependence, disagreement, and predicates of personal taste.Peter Lasersohn - 2005 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (6):643--686.
Adjectives in context.Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge.
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